HRRS-Nummer: HRRS 2006 Nr. 62
Bearbeiter: Karsten Gaede
Zitiervorschlag: EGMR, Nr. 33354/96, Urteil v. 27.02.2001, HRRS 2006 Nr. 62
[Zum Sachverhalt. Der Beschwerdeführer (Bf.) Lucà wurde von italienischen Gerichten wegen Drogenhandels verurteilt. Seine Verurteilung zu einer Geldstrafe und zu 8 Jahren und 4 Monaten Freiheitsstrafe wurde wesentlich auf die Angaben des zunächst verdächtigen und später ebenfalls angeklagten N. gestützt, der sich nach seinem Aufgreifen durch die Polizei entschlossen hatte, mit den Ermittlungsbehörden zusammen zu arbeiten. N. verweigerte in der Hauptverhandlung die Aussage mit Verweis auf sein Schweigerecht. Die italienischen Gerichte griffen sodann auf die im Ermittlungsverfahren von N. gemachten Angaben zurück. Insbesondere in Rechtsmittelverfahren erhobene Beschwerden auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Art. 6 Abs. 1 und Abs. 3 d EMRK wiesen sie als unbegründet zurück.]
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant, who was born in 1955, is currently detained in Cosenza Prison.
9. On 25 October 1992 N. and C. were arrested by carabinieri from Roccella Jonica (Reggio de Calabre) and found to be in possession of cocaine.
10. On 25 and 26 October 1992 N. was questioned, initially by the carabinieri, and subsequently by the Locri Public Prosecutor (Reggio de Calabre). He said that he had obtained part of the drugs from C. for his own use; the remainder belonged solely to C. He added that on the day of their arrest, C. had accompanied him to certain people's homes to try to buy drugs. After the evening meal they had gone to the applicant's home. The applicant had said that he was prepared to supply them with five hundred grammes of cocaine to be delivered a few days later, as he was not willing to accept deferred payment and could not go out after 8 p.m. to get the drugs.
11. N. was questioned by the carabinieri as someone who was helping them with their inquiries ("persona che puó riferire circostanze utili ai fini delle indagini"), not as an accused. For that reason, he was not assisted by a lawyer. However, the Locri Public Prosecutor subsequently decided that N. should be regarded as a "suspect" ("indagato"), and therefore questioned him in that capacity.
12. By an order of 12 February 1993 the Locri investigating judge committed the applicant, C. and two other suspects, Mr A. and Mr T., for trial before Locri Criminal Court for drug-trafficking. A. was also accused of unlawful possession of an offensive weapon. Separate proceedings were instituted against N. for possession of drugs.
13. At the hearing on 17 July 1993, N. was called to give evidence as a person accused in connected proceedings ("imputato in procedimento connesso"). However, he chose to remain silent as he was entitled to do by virtue of Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter, the "CCP").
14. The lawyers acting for the accused argued that Article 513 of the CCP was unconstitutional since it was incompatible with Articles 3 and 24 of the Italian Constitution - which guaranteed the equality of citizens before the law and the right to defend oneself at all stages of the proceedings - and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter "the Convention"). They observed in particular that, as construed by the Constitutional Court, Article 513 of the CCP laid down that if a person accused in connected proceedings exercised his right to remain silent, the court could read and use any statements made by him to the public prosecutor or to the investigating judge during the investigation. As a result, the accused was deprived of any opportunity of examining that person or of having him examined.
15. On the same day the Criminal Court dismissed as manifestly unfounded the objection that the provision was unconstitutional and ordered that the record of the statements made by N. to the public prosecutor should be read out. It noted that the statutory right to remain silent was intended to protect an accused, who could not be required to make statements that could be used in evidence against him. Further, the rule that statements made during preliminary investigations could be read and used had been established by the Constitutional Court itself in its judgment no. 254 of 3 June 1992.
16. In a judgment of 7 March 1994, which was lodged with the registry on 1 June 1994, Locri Criminal Court sentenced the applicant to eight years and four months' imprisonment and a fine of 54,000,000 Italian lire (approximately FRF 183,000). C., A. and T. were also given prison sentences ranging between six and nine years.
17. The Criminal Court noted at the outset that the main evidence against the accused was the statements which N. had made to the public prosecutor, since the statements made to the carabinieri were inadmissible under Article 513 of the CCP. It also observed that having regard to N.'s personality and the spontaneity and precision with which his statements had been made, his depositions should be regarded as credible. The Criminal Court noted that N. had recognised a photograph of the applicant and had given an accurate description of his home and the route followed to get there. In addition, the applicant already had previous convictions under the drug-trafficking legislation and was under judicial supervision ("sorveglianza speciale"). He was prohibited from leaving his home after dusk, and that was a possible explanation for his unwillingness to go out after 8 p.m. Furthermore, the amount of cocaine found in C.'s possession showed that C. had contacts with drug dealers and meant that N's account of his visit to the applicant's home was probably true. It also confirmed that the negotiations that had started were genuine.
18. On 13 July 1994 the applicant appealed to Reggio de Calabre Court of Appeal. He contested, inter alia, the reliability of N.'s statements and complained that they had been made in breach of the adversarial principle and in the absence of a judge or of the defendants' lawyers.
19. In a judgment of 7 November 1994, Reggio de Calabre Court of Appeal followed in substance the arguments set out in the order of 17 July 1993. It upheld the decision of the court below concerning the applicant, while reducing A.'s sentence.
20. On 18 February 1995 the applicant and his co-accused appealed to the Court of Cassation. T. relied, inter alia, on Article 6 § 3(d) of the Convention contending that N's statements should have been declared inadmissible in evidence.
21. In a judgment of 19 October 1995, which was lodged with the registry on 3 November 1995, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeals of the applicant and his co-accused, holding that the grounds given by the Court of Appeal for its decision on all the disputed issues relating to the drug-trafficking count had been reasonable and correct. It overruled the impugned decision with regard to A.'s conviction for being unlawfully in possession of an offensive weapon and remitted the case to Catanzaro Court of Appeal.
22. The Court of Cassation observed among other things that Article 6 § 3(d) of the Convention concerned " the examination of witnesses, who ... are required to tell the truth, not the examination of the accused, who are entitled to defend themselves by remaining silent or even by lying". Further, since all States that were party to the Convention had an obligation by relevant domestic legislation to regulate the examination of witnesses, it was "obvious that ... when a witness refused to give evidence, statements made to the public prosecutor ... had to be produced for the court's file".
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
...
I. VERLETZUNG DER ART. 6 I UND III LIT. D EMRK
31. The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and alleged that he had been convicted on the basis of statements made to the public prosecutor, without being given an opportunity to examine the maker of the statements, N., or to have him examined. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
1. In the determination of... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing... by [a]... tribunal...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;..."
32. The Government submitted that, in principle, the Italian legal system afforded the accused the right to examine prosecution witnesses. However, in order to establish the facts of the case, the trial court was permitted in certain circumstances and subject to complying with the statutory conditions to rely in reaching its decision on evidence obtained during the preliminary investigation.
33. In the instant case, under the relevant Italian legislation, N. was not a "witness" but a "person accused in connected proceedings", and was entitled to remain silent. As the Court itself had recognised in the Saunders case (see the Saunders v. the United Kingdom judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2064, § 68), "although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6". Accordingly, the domestic authorities had had no alternative but to accept N.'s decision not to give evidence, since requiring him to repeat his statements at the trial would have entailed a violation of his fundamental rights.
34. The Government emphasised that three interests had been at stake: the right of the co-accused to remain silent, the right of the accused to examine a co-accused witness and the right of the judicial authority not to be deprived of evidence obtained during the investigation. The issue was so complex that the provisions governing the admissibility of the statements of a prosecution witness who was also a co-accused had been examined on several occasions by the Italian Constitutional Court and been the subject of amendments. In particular, the Constitutional Court had restated in its case-law the principle that a court should not be deprived of evidence obtained during the investigation ("non dispersione").
35. The Government observed lastly that on 10 September 1997, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had adopted recommendation R (97) 13, concerning the Intimidation of Witnesses and the Rights of the Defence, in which it was suggested that States should use "pre-trial statements given before a judicial authority as evidence in court when it is not possible for witnesses to appear before the court or when appearing in court might result in great and actual danger to the life and security of witnesses, their relatives or other persons close to them".
36. The applicant disagreed with the Government's arguments. He said that his contention was not that the domestic courts had failed to apply the provisions in force at the material time, but that those provisions were incompatible with the principles set out in the Convention. Furthermore, the fact that the Italian Parliament had decided on 7 August 1997 to amend Article 513 of the CCP only went to confirm the view that the provision in question infringed every accused person's "right to put the prosecution to proof". He stressed, lastly, that N.'s statements had been the only evidence against him.
[Übersetzung des Bearbeiters]
37. Da die Erfordernisse des Art. 6 Abs. 3 als besondere Ausprägungen des von Art. 6 Abs. 1 garantierten Rechts auf ein faires Verfahren anzusehen sind, wird der Gerichtshof die unter diesen beiden Vorschriften erhobenen Beschwerden gemeinsam prüfen (vgl. unter vielen anderen Nachweisen (vgl. neben vielen anderen Nachweisen das Urteil Van Mechelen u.a. v. Die Niederlande vom 23. April 1997, Reports 1997-III, S. 711, § 49).
38. Der Gerichtshof wiederholt, dass die Zulässigkeit von Beweismitteln in erster Linie eine durch nationales Recht zu regelnde Frage darstellt und dass es im Allgemeinen den nationalen Gerichten obliegt, die ihnen vorliegenden Beweise zu würdigen. Die Aufgabe des Gerichtshofs besteht nicht darin, zu entscheiden, ob Zeugenaussagen zutreffend als Beweismittel zugelassen worden sind, sondern darin, sich zu versichern, ob das Verfahren einschließlich der Art und Weise, wie Beweismittel erhoben worden sind, fair gewesen ist (vgl. unter anderem das Urteil Doorson v. Die Niederlande vom 26. März 1996, Reports 1996-II, S. 470, § 67 und das Urteil Van Mechelen u.a. aaO, S. 711, § 50).
39. Alle Beweismittel müssen grundsätzlich in Anwesenheit des Angeklagten in einer öffentlichen Hauptverhandlung mit der Möglichkeit zur Erörterung durch die Prozesskontrahenten erhoben werden. Es gibt von diesem Prinzip Ausnahmen, doch dürfen diese nicht die Rechte der Verteidigung verletzen. In der Regel erfordern diese Rechte, dass der Angeklagte eine adäquate und geeignete Gelegenheit erhält, einen Belastungszeugen in Frage zu stellen und ihn zu befragen, entweder wenn er seine Aussage macht oder zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt (siehe das Urteil Lüdi v. Schweiz vom 15. Juni 1992, Serie A Nr. 238, § 49 und das Urteil Van Mechelen u.a. aaO, S. 711, § 51).
40. Wie der Gerichtshof bei einer Reihe von Gelegenheiten festgestellt hat (vgl. neben anderen Nachweisen, das Urteil Isgró v. Italien vom 19. Februar 1991, Serie A Nr. 194-A, § 34, und das Urteil Lüdi v. Schweiz aaO, § 47), kann es sich unter Umständen als erforderlich erweisen, auf Angaben zurückzugreifen, die während der Ermittlungsstadien gemacht worden sind (insbesondere dann, wenn ein Zeuge sich weigert, seine Angaben öffentlich zu wiederholen, weil er um seine Sicherheit fürchtet, eine nicht selten in Verfahren auftretendes Phänomen, die mafiaähnliche Organisationen betreffen). Wenn dem Angeklagten eine adäquate und angemessene Gelegenheit gegeben worden ist, die Angaben auf die Probe zu stellen, entweder wenn die Angaben gemacht worden sind oder zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt, verletzt ihre Zulassung als Beweismittel für sich genommen nicht Art. 6 Abs. 1 und Abs. 3 lit. d EMRK. Im Gegensatz hierzu sind die Verteidigungsrechte jedoch dann, wenn eine Verurteilung allein oder zu einem entscheidendem Grad auf Aussagen beruht, die von einer Person gemacht worden sind, hinsichtlich derer der Angeklagte weder während der Ermittlungen noch während des gerichtlichen Hauptverfahrens eine Gelegenheit hatte, sie zu prüfen oder prüfen zu lassen, in einem Ausmaß beschränkt, das mit den von Art. 6 EMRK gewährten Garantien unvereinbar ist (vgl. die Urteile Unterpertinger v. Österreich vom 24. November 1986, Serie A Nr. 110, §§ 31-33; Saïdi v. Frankreich vom 20. September 1993, Serie A Nr. 261-C, §§ 43-44 und Van Mechelen u.a. aaO, S. 712, § 55; vgl. auch Dorigo v. Italien, Beschwerde Nr. 33286/96, Commission Report of 9. September 1998, § 43, unpubliziert, § 43 und, zum gleichen Fall, Committee of Ministers Resolution HR (99) 258 vom 15. April 1999).
41. Hierbei ist der Umstand, dass die Angaben - wie hier - von einem Mitangeklagten und nicht von einem Zeugen [nach nationalem Recht] gemacht worden sind, bedeutungslos. Diesbezüglich wiederholt der Gerichtshof, dass der Begriff "Zeuge" im Konventionssystem eine "autonome" Bedeutung zukommt (vgl. das Urteil Vidal v. Belgien vom 22. April 1992, Serie A Nr. 235-B, § 33). Folglich stellt eine Aussage dann, wenn sie zu einem erheblichen Grad als Grundlage für eine Verurteilung dienen kann, ein Beweismittel dar, auf das die von Art. 6 Abs. 1 und 3 lit. d EMRK eröffneten Garantien Anwendung finden, unbeschadet dessen, ob von einem Zeugen im engeren Sinne oder von einen Mitangeklagten gemacht worden ist (vgl., mutatis mutandis, das Urteil Ferrantelli und Santangelo v. Italien vom 7. August 1996, Reports 1996-III, §§ 51 und 52).
42. Im Licht des Vorhergehenden erscheinen die vom Kassationshof in seiner Entscheidung vom 19. Oktober 1995 gegebenen Gründe für die Zurückweisung des gemäß Art. 6 III lit. d EMRK erhobenen Rechtsmittels - und auf die sich auch die betroffene Regierung teilweise gestützt hat, - nicht einschlägig. Besonders der Umstand, dass das Gericht nach dem damals in Kraft befindlichen nationalen Recht (vgl. § 26 oben) vor Beginn des gerichtlichen Verfahrens gemachte Aussagen für zulässig erklären konnte, wenn ein Mitangeklagter Aussagen verweigert hat, kann einem Angeklagten nicht das Recht des Art. 6 III lit. d EMRK entziehen, welches ihm zugesteht, in einem adversatorischen Verfahren jeden bedeutenden Zeugenbeweis gegen ihn zu prüfen oder prüfen zu lassen.
43. Im vorliegenden Fall bemerkt der Gerichtshof, dass die innerstaatlichen Gerichte den Bf. allein auf der Basis von Aussagen verurteilt haben, die von N. vor Beginn des gerichtlichen Verfahrens gemacht worden sind und dass weder dem Bf. noch seinem Verteidiger zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt des Verfahrens Gelegenheit gegeben wurde, ihn zu befragen.
44. Unter diesen Umständen ist der Gerichtshof nicht zufrieden gestellt, dass dem Bf eine adäquate und angemessene Gelegenheit gegeben wurde, die Aussagen zu bestreiten, auf denen seine Verurteilung beruhte.
45. Dem Bf wurde deshalb ein faires Verfahren versagt. Folglich ist eine Verletzung der Art. 6 Abs. 1 und Abs. 3 lit. d EMRK aufgetreten.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
...
1. hält der Gerichtshof einstimmig eine Verletzung des Art. 6 §§ 1 und 3(d) EMRK für gegeben"
[Redaktioneller Hinweis: Hinsichtlich der mit sechs zu eins Stimmen gefassten Entscheidung gemäß Art. 41 EMRK ist der Entscheidung ein Sondervotum von Zupancic beigefügt. Zum Konfrontationsrecht gerade auch bei Mitangeklagten vgl. Demko ZStR 122 (2004), 416 ff.; Sommer NJW 2005, 1240 ff.; BGH JR 2005, 247, 248 m. Anm. Esser; im Kontext der Haas-Entscheidung zur EGMR-Rechtsprechung demnächst auch Gaede JR 2006, Heft 2 oder 3.]
HRRS-Nummer: HRRS 2006 Nr. 62
Bearbeiter: Karsten Gaede